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Compounded over a century, 2 percent annual growth (roughly the recent 
growth rate of the U.S. economy) increases wealth more than 7 times, and 10 
percent annual growth (roughly the recent growth rate of the Chinese economy) 
increases wealth by almost 14,000 times.
4  Differences in sustained growth 
cause one country’s wealth to overtake another country faster than the mind can 
grasp.   
Like individuals, nations are highly competitive.  Poor nations hope to 
overtake rich nations, and rich nations fear being overtaken.  Besides relative 
income, individuals and nations care about absolute income. Most people want to 
live a long time and educate their children absolutely.  Life expectancy at birth is 
83 years in Japan and 66 years in Bangladesh.
5  Enrollment in secondary school 
is 98 percent among Japanese children of the appropriate age and 42 percent in 
Bangladesh.
6  Almost everyone would prefer to live at the level of Japan rather 
than Bangladesh.   
                                                 
1 Robert Cooter is Herman Selvin Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley. 
2 Aaron Edlin is Richard W. Jennings Professor of Law and Professor of Economics at 
Berkeley 
3 Robert Cooter excerpted this presentation from two joint writings with Aaron Edlin: 
“Chapter 2: Clearings and Thickets” in a preliminary book manuscript tentatively entitled 
Introduction to Law and Growth Economics, and  “Overtaking” in The American Illness, 
ed. Frank Buckley (Yale University Press, 2012).  
4 1.02 to the power 100 equals 7.2; 1.10 to the power 100 equals 13,781. Growth in 
national income per capita is a better indicator of welfare than growth in national income.  
According to the CIA’s World Factbook, U.S. population growth rate is roughly 1percent 
(among the highest among developed countries), and China’s population growth rate is .5 
percent.   
5 Life expectancy at birth, total (years)) in 2008, World Bank. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN.  Note that life expectancy is in the 
40s in many African countries.   
6 Data & Statistics on Education for 2007 and 2008, World Bank, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTEDUCATION/0,,content
MDK:20573961~menuPK:282404~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:282386,00
.html.   3 
Much contemporary policy discussion concerns redistribution of income, 
but growth has more powerful effects on human welfare.  The lowest wage 
earners in the U.S. or any country would benefit far more in the long run from a 
faster growth rate in national income than from redistributing existing national 
wealth in their favor.   Even people who depend on transfer payments would 
benefit more from faster growth than income redistribution.  A faster growth rate 
increases wages and tax revenues available for transfer payments, and this 
increase overtakes gains in welfare from redistributing income.
7   Returning to 
our previous comparison, 1 percent of an increase of 14,000 is 20 times more 
than 100 percent of an increase of 7 times.   
To appreciate the mathematics of overtaking, consider two sequences of 
utility in an infinite number of generations.  In the first sequence, income per 
capita grows at a faster rate.  In the second sequence, growth is slower and 
initial utility is higher.  The sum of utilities in the first sequence overtakes the sum 
of utilities in the second sequence whenever policy makers give weight to future 
generations that is similar to the weight given to the present generation.
8  
Although this “overtaking theorem” concerns infinite time, in practice overtaking 
occurs quicker than people imagine, because they fail to appreciate fully the 
effects of compound growth.  Given overtaking, anyone who values human 
welfare should recognize growth’s importance as a policy goal. 
In the preceding propositions, “growth” has two attributes lacking in 
standard measures of national income such as gross domestic product (GDP).  
The first attribute is sustainability.  Growth overtakes other welfare considerations 
when it is sustainable and continues into the future.  Sustainable growth uses 
                                                 
7 The largest effect of income redistribution on human welfare is through growth.  
Sometimes more inequality causes more growth by improving incentives for innovation, 
as in China after 1980.  Sometimes redistributive expenditures promote growth by 
improving the education and health of workers as with free primary schools and prenatal 
clinics.     
8 Robert Cooter and Aaron Edlin, Maximizing Growth vs. Static Efficiency or 
Redistribution, Berkeley Law and Economics Working Paper (2010) prove formally that 
overtaking always occurs provided the social planner’s preferences for equality are not 
too strong.    4 
natural resources in fixed supply at a decreasing rate, whereas unsustainable 
growth uses them at a constant or increasing rate (or a rate that does not 
decrease fast enough).  The second attribute is comprehensiveness.  A 
comprehensive measure of wealth encompasses all valuable goods, including 
non-market goods such as public goods and the environment. By contrast, a 
partial measure of wealth such as GDP excludes goods that are not sold in 
markets.  When comparing welfare, partial measures may make little sense, 
because a loss in unmeasured wealth may offset a gain in measured wealth.  
Thus burning more coal to power air conditioners increases the simplest 
measure of market income, but it does not necessarily increase a full measure of 
wealth if pollution increases significantly.  
The case for increasing the rate of sustainable, comprehensive growth is 
compelling, but how is it to be done? Innovation proximately causes sustained 
growth in income per capita. In fact, innovation is the only way to have 
sustainable growth in a world of finite resources.  Education, communication, 
transportation, immigration, organization, taxation, and many other factors affect 
innovation.  This essay takes the legal perspective.  From this perspective, the 
normative question of growth economics is, “Which laws increase the pace of 
economic innovation?”   
Property law establishes the ownership of objects by people.  Ownership 
conveys a bundle of rights that describe what people may do with what they own 
-- possess, use, develop, improve, transform, consume, deplete, destroy, sell, 
donate, bequeath, transfer, mortgage, lease, loan, exclude, and so forth.  By 
attaching objects to people, property law supplies a framework for making and 
distributing wealth, which can stimulate or suffocate economic growth.  Given the 
right bundle of rights and effective protection of them, an economy can grow and 
enrich the nation.  Given ineffective protection or the wrong bundle of rights, an 
economy can decline and impoverish the nation.   
Sustained growth comes from economic innovation.  Discovering new 
ideas and developing them usually requires investment by entrepreneurs. An 
innovator has a temporary advantage over competitors until they catch up.  While   5 
the temporary advantage lasts, the innovator enjoys extraordinary profits, which 
we call “venture profits.”  Higher venture profits imply stronger incentives for 
innovation.  To increase the pace of innovation, laws should increase venture 
profits.   
Intellectual property law, which includes patents and copyright law, 
establishes the ownership of innovations by people.  It conveys a bundle of rights 
to creators as determined by rules.  Applied to intellectual property law, the 
normative question of growth economics is, “Which ownership rules maximize 
innovation?” In order to increase the pace of innovation, ownership rules should 
increase venture profits.  So the question of this essay is, “Which ownership rules 
maximize venture profits?” 
How Intellectual Property Law Promotes Growth 
 
To answer this question, we begin by explaining how innovations become 
property.  Legal ownership sometimes goes to the first person to invent a 
machine, create a molecule, extract a vaccine, compose a song, write a book, or 
record a performance.  The first person to embody a new idea in an innovation 
may acquire private ownership of it through patent or copyright law.  These two 
bodies of law convey ownership to intellectual creations, so they are called 
“intellectual property law.”   
Intellectual property rights sometimes increase investment in innovations.  
Thus Figure 2.1 depicts the payoffs to an innovation over its life cycle, from 
discovery to obsolescence.  Developing a new idea in period 0 costs 8.  We 
assume that the developer receives a patent for the innovation, which prohibits 
others from using it without his permission.  Next the innovation is launched and 
sold to buyers.  When launched in period 1, the innovation has no competitors, 
so the innovator is a monopolist who receives a payoff of 7.  In period 2, imitators 
develop competing products that substitute for the patented innovation, which 
reduces the innovator’s payoff to 4.  In period 3, the patent expires and 
competition intensifies.  Others can now produce the same goods at the same 
cost as the innovator.  Taking competition to its logical extreme, we assume that   6 
the market is perfectly competitive in period 3 and the innovator’s payoff is zero.  
Summing over the life cycle, the innovator’s net payoff equals +3, so developing 
the innovation is profitable to the innovator.  If the innovator can foresee this fact 
in period 0, it will develop the innovation.  Generalizing, the expectation of 
positive venture profits causes the development of innovations. 
Figure 2.1.  Payoff to Innovator with Property Right 
 
 
The innovator in Figure 2.1 receives an effective patent.  However, many 
innovations are not patentable and many countries have ineffective patent laws.  
Figure 2.2 illustrates how the numbers might change if the innovator does not 
receive an effective patent.  The innovator in Figure 2.2 spends 8 in period 0 to 
develop the product.  Although the innovator does not receive an effective patent, 
the innovator still enjoys the temporary advantage of being first to market the 
innovation.  When the innovation is launched in period 1, the innovator has no 
competitors and enjoys profits of 7.  After launch, however, imitators freely copy 
the innovation, without bearing the cost of developing it.  We assume that the 
market reaches a competitive equilibrium in period 2, so the innovator’s payoff is 
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payoff equals -1.  Without intellectual property protection, the innovator cannot 
recover the cost of developing the new idea.  If the innovator can foresee this fact 
in period 0, it will not develop the innovation.  Generalizing, the expectation of 
negative venture profits prevents the development of innovations. 




Effective intellectual property law transforms the innovator’s loss in Figure 
2.2 into the gain in Figure 2.1.  The comparison between the two figures 
illustrates that intellectual property rights are necessary to innovation when 
development costs are high relative to the payoff from launching an innovation 
first.  In contrast, some innovations have low development costs relative to the 
payoff from launching first.  This can occur either because the innovation is 
particularly cheap to develop, or because launching it first yields a big advantage 
for the innovator.  In such cases, intellectual property rights may not be 
necessary for innovation.   
Figure 2.3 illustrates this possibility.  As in Figure 2.2, the innovator in 
Figure 2.3 who develops the product spends 8 on development and does not 
receive an effective patent.  As in Figure 2.2, the launch in period 1 yields profits 
































"  8 
assume that the innovation in Figure 2.3 is a differentiated product that yields a 
payoff of 3 in period 2.  The imitations in period 2 are not quite as good as the 
original. (In contrast, Figure 2.2 assumes that the imitations in period 2 are 
perfect substitutes for the original.)  Summing over the life cycle in Figure 2.3, the 
innovator’s net payoff equals +2, so developing the product is profitable to the 
innovator.  If the innovator can foresee this fact in period 0, it will develop the 
innovation, even though it will not receive a patent.  Generalizing, an innovation 
is profitable without intellectual property protection when development costs are 
low relative to the payoff from launching first.   
Figure 2.3.  Payoffs With Developer’s Advantage and Without Property 
Right  
 
Besides making an unprofitable innovation profitable, effective intellectual 
property law can make a profitable innovation more profitable.  Thus a patent in 
Figure 2.3 might increase the payoff in period 2 from 3 to 4, so the innovator’s 
net payoff summed over the life cycle increases from +2 to +3.  This conclusion, 
however, does not generalize.  Stronger intellectual property rights for a 
particular innovation make it more profitable, but stronger intellectual property 
rights for all innovations can increase or decrease venture profits overall.  (More 
































"  9 
Intellectual property law differs from one country to another and it changes 
with time.  Thus U.S. patent duration is 20 years from the date of filing the patent 
application. (Before 1995, U.S. patent duration was 17 years from the date the 
patent issued.)  Besides duration, patents also differ in breadth -- a patent on all 
umbrellas is broader than a patent on umbrellas that open automatically.  The 
duration and breadth of a patent define its scope.  The law requires anyone who 
acts within the scope of someone else’s patent to license the right to do so from 
its owner.  Acting within the scope of a patent and without a license infringes it.  
The owner can sue to prevent future infringements and to recover damages for 
past infringements.   
Patent law strengthens by increasing the number, breadth, or duration of 
patents.  Thus a controversial development recently strengthened US patent law 
by allowing inventors to patent new business processes, which were formerly 
considered unpatentable, such as Amazon’s patent on “one-click” ordering from 
its online catalogue.  “Stronger patent law” refers to a change in rules that 
increases the scope of private ownership of innovations, leaving less scope for 
unowned innovations.   
Thus Figure 2.4 divides future innovations into “ownable” and 
“unownable.”  A new computer chip is ownable (patentable) and a new metaphor 
in the English language is unownable (no patent, no copyright).  The boundary of 
the ownable is labeled β.  Strengthening the patent system increases ownable 
innovations and decreases unownable innovations, as indicated in Figure 2.4 by 
shifting the boundary from β to β`.  In effect, stronger patents fence in more of 
the common land of innovation.
9 
Figure 2.4. Future Innovations 
                                                 
9 Increases in the scope of a particular patent do not necessarily increase the scope of 
patents as a whole.  Rather, the scope of a particular patent can increase by decreasing the 
scope of another patent.  Instead of fencing more of the common land of innovation, the 
fence between patent holders moves to the advantage of one of them and to the 
disadvantage of the other.    10 
 
Our discussion of Figures 2.1 to 2.3 explained that stronger patents rights 
sometimes make unprofitable innovations profitable and profitable innovations 
more profitable.  When stronger intellectual property rights make innovations 
more profitable, the number of innovations usually increases.  To see why, think 
of an array of new ideas that differ according to the expected profitability of 
developing them.  Innovators develop the ideas that they expect to yield positive 
profits, and they do not develop the ideas that they expect to yield negative 
profits.  If stronger intellectual property rights increase the expected profits for 
innovations, some ideas will tip from negative to positive expected profits, so 
innovators will want to develop them.   
Figure 2.5 illustrates this possibility.  The horizontal axis indicates an 









*+$  11 
curve R indicates revenues given weak patents.   The revenue curve R intersects 
the cost curve C at point i.  To the left of i, revenues R exceed costs C, so the 
innovations will be developed.  To the right of i, costs C exceed revenues R, so 
the innovations will not be developed.  The tipping point is i, which equals the 
number of developed innovations.  By assumption, strengthening patents in this 
industry increases revenues from R to R`.  We assume that costs C do not 
change.   With strong patents, the revenue curve R` intersects the cost curve C 
at point i`, which indicates the number of developed innovations.  Thus stronger 
patents cause the development of innovations to increase from i to i`.   
Figure 2.5. Development of Innovations  
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I.  How Much Ownership?  
 
What strength of intellectual property rights maximizes innovation?  From 
the preceding discussion, you might think that the general answer is, “The 
ownership rules that give innovators the strongest property rights.”  You might 
reason that stronger intellectual property rights always increase the profitability of 
innovating, which causes more of it.  If that is what you think, then you are half 
right.   Increased profitability of innovating causes more innovation, all else equal, 
but stronger intellectual property rights do not always increase the profitability of 
innovating.   
What determines whether stronger patents increase or decrease venture 
profits?    The answer is remarkably simple.  A stronger patent transfers wealth to 
its owner from someone else.  The pace of innovation increases or decreases 
depending on the transfer’s source.  Stronger patents increase venture profits in 
so far as they shift wealth from consumers and producers to innovators, whereas 
stronger patents decrease venture profits in so far as they shift wealth from one 
innovator to another. 
To see why, contrast consumption, production, and innovation.  
Households use innovations such as new pharmaceutical drugs for consumption.   
Stronger property rights for such innovations transfers wealth from consumers to 
innovators.  The prospect of greater wealth causes more ventures to develop 
pharmaceutical innovations.  Thus stronger intellectual property rights for 
pharmaceuticals cause more innovation in drugs.  Whereas consumers mostly 
use most pharmaceutical drugs, firms mostly use industrial robots for production.  
Stronger property rights for such innovations in industrial robots transfers wealth 
from producers to innovators.  Since industrial robots are mostly used in 
production, stronger intellectual property rights cause more innovation in 
industrial robots.   Generalizing, intellectual property rights that transfer wealth 
from static uses (production and consumption) to dynamic uses (innovation) 
increase the pace of economic growth.   
Besides consuming and producing, innovations are used for innovating. 
Today’s new molecule is discovered from yesterday’s new molecule; today’s new   13 
operating system is discovered from yesterday’s new operating system; today’s 
new power cell is discovered from yesterday’s new power cell.   Prior innovations 
often propel subsequent innovations in a cascade.  If someone owns yesterday’s 
innovation, then researchers must pay to use it to develop today’s innovation.  
Thus assume that firm B sells its improved operating system to firm C, and firm C 
uses it to develop a new operating system that is even better.  Stronger 
intellectual property rights increase C’s revenues from selling its innovation, and 
also increase C’s cost of using B’s innovation. 
When innovations are mostly used to make other innovations, do stronger 
intellectual property rights increase or decrease venture profits overall?  The 
standard economics of monopoly provides the answer.  The owner of intellectual 
property is a temporary monopolist.  According to standard economic analysis, 
the increase in the seller’s profits from monopoly is less than the decrease in the 
buyers’ profits.  The shortfall is the “dead weight” loss of monopoly.
10  Standard 
economic theory predicts a dead weight loss -- the gainers gain less than the 
losers lose.  Thus strengthening property rights in a cascade of innovations 
causes a deadweight loss that reduces the overall profitability of innovating.  
Venture profits decrease overall by the amount of the deadweight loss.  When 
stronger intellectual property rights redistribute wealth among innovators, the 
gainers gain less than the losers lose. Generalizing, intellectual property rights 
that transfer wealth from one dynamic use to another decrease the pace of 
economic growth.  
We have described two opposing effects of stronger intellectual property 
rights.  The first effect is the transfer of wealth from static to dynamic uses.  This 
effect dominates where innovators mostly sell to consumers and producers.  For 
these innovations, strong intellectual property rights maximize the rate of 
innovation.  The second effect is the deadweight loss from monopoly 
transactions among innovators.  The second effect dominates where innovators 
                                                 
10 Monopoly transfers profits from the buyers to the monopolistic seller.  Besides the 
transfer, some profits disappear in a pure waste.  “Dead weight loss” is the pure waste of 
resources caused by monopoly.  For details, see any intermediate microeconomics 
textbook.      14 
use each other’s innovations intensively.  Strengthening property rights for 
innovations in a cascade causes a deadweight loss that reduces the overall 
profitability of innovating.  For these innovations, weak intellectual property rights 
maximize the rate of growth.  
To illustrate graphically, Figure 2.6 depicts some possible relationships 
between the rate of innovation and patent length, which is one dimension of 
patent strength. The horizontal axis indicates the length of patents in years, and 
the vertical axis indicates the rate of innovation.  For curve A, the rate of 
innovation is an increasing function of patent length.  Curve A depicts an industry 
where innovators sell mostly to consumers and producers, such as 
pharmaceutical drugs.  For curve C, the rate of innovation is a decreasing 
function of patent length.  Curve C depicts an industry where innovators 
especially sell to each other.  Thus the computer operating system Unix has 
many variants, including the one called BSD developed at the University of 
California at Berkeley and used in Apple computers.  BSD is “unowned,” or “in 
the public domain,” or “open access”.  Many observers believe that open access 
to BSD has increased the rate of innovations based on it. 
Before turning to a new topic, we mention another drag of intellectual 
property rights on innovation.  Using someone else’s intellectual property 
requires licensing it, which takes time and effort.  The cost of negotiating licenses 
reduces venture profits and slows innovation.  Thus if someone owned the Unix 
operating system, then anyone who wanted to use it would have to license it.  In 
fact, no one privately owns Unix, so using it does not require negotiating with 
anyone.
11   The deadweight loss from monopoly and the negotiating costs of 
licensing are both costs of intellectual property rights.
12 
                                                 
11 This consideration may justify the “research exemption,” or the “Hatch-Waxman 
exemption” in US patent law.  Firms that invest in a new drug often need to perform 
research to gain regulatory approval.  The research exemption allows firms to use 
patented drugs freely for research on regulatory compliance without a license from the 
patent’s owner. 
12 We distinguish between the deadweight loss from monopoly and transactions costs.  




Figure 2.6.  Rate of Innovation and Patent Length  
 
Curve A depicts innovations where the dominant effect of intellectual 
property rights is the transfer from static to dynamic uses, and Curve C depicts 
innovations where the opposite is true.  Many innovations are in between these 
pure cases:  The transfer effect dominates when intellectual property rights are 
too weak, and the deadweight effect dominates when intellectual property rights 
are too strong.  In between these extremes, the rate of innovation is maximized.  
                                                                                                                                               
speaking, zero transaction costs allow perfect price discrimination, which eliminate the 







9!  16 
Curve B in Figure 2.6 depicts this situation, where moderately strong intellectual 
property rights maximize the rate of innovation.  The optimal patent duration of 
patents is internal for curve B, not extreme as for curves A and C.   
To illustrate, J.K. Rowling sold 8.3 million copies of Harry Potter and the 
Deathly Hallows on the first day of its publication.
13  Effective copyright law gave 
Rowling secure ownership of an original expression, so she did not fear that 
publication would lead to pirating and unauthorized performances in movies or 
plays.  In contrast, Shakespeare made only a few copies of each play that he 
wrote.  (Consequently, humanity almost lost its greatest theatrical legacy.
14)  With 
ineffective copyright laws, Shakespeare profited from selling tickets to 
performances of his plays, not from their publication.  He did not want his plays 
published because he did not want others to perform them.  Ineffective copyright 
made secrecy necessary for Shakespeare. Everyone can agree that copyright 
protection for Shakespeare in his day would have disseminated his plays faster, 
and everyone can agree that extending that protection to the present day would 
needlessly hinder their dissemination.  So the optimal duration of a 
Shakespearean copyright is found from a curve shaped like B in Figure 2.6.  
Lets apply this reasoning to the duration of US copyright.  Since its 
eighteenth century beginning, the United States has lengthened the duration of a 
copyright until it now stands as the creator’s life plus 70 years.  To maximize 
creativity, is copyright’s durations about right, too long, or too short?  Many 
scholars believe that a shorter copyright would promote creativity.  It’s easy to 
see why. Remote payoffs have little present value.  If someone discounts future 
profits by 10% per year, then the present value of $100 paid in 70 years in 10 
cents.  With little present value, remote future profits have little effect on present 
behavior.  Few authors write books so that their heirs will receive royalties 70 
years after their death.  As the date of creation fades into history, however, the 
                                                 
13 Motoko Rich, “Record First-Day Sales for Last ‘Harry Potter’ Book - New York 
Times,” July 22, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/22/books/22cnd-
potter.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. 
14 Greenblatt, Stephen, Will in the World: How Shakespeare Became Shakespeare. (W. 
W. Norton & Company, New York, 2004)   17 
costs increase to locate the copyright holder and obtain permission to use the 
book.  This cost has prevented Google from distributing many out-of-print books 
on the Internet.  If Google can obtain the right to put these books are online, 
scholars from Peoria to Port Moresby will have equal access to many materials 
currently accessible only to scholars working in the Harvard library.
15  Many 
scholars believe that excessive length of US copyright dampens creativity and 
benefits special interests with influence in Congress. 
Curves A, B, and C in Figure 2.6 depict three possible relationships that 
often exist between the rate of innovation and the strength of intellectual property 
rights.  (We will not discuss other possible shapes besides those depicted in 
Figure 2.6.
16) For curves with these shapes, a simple rule leads to the maximum:  
Starting from 0, increase the strength of intellectual property rights so long as 
venture profits increase.  On curve B, the maximum occurs where a small 
increase in the strength of intellectual property rights does not increase or 
decrease overall profits in the dynamic sector.  Specifically the maximum occurs 
when a small increase in patent length increases the deadweight loss among 
innovators by the same amount as the wealth transferred from consumers and 
producers to innovators. 
II.  Consolidation 
 
Figure 2.4 depicts boundary β separating owned and unowned 
innovations, like a fence separating private and common land. Stronger 
intellectual property rights correspond to a larger area for owned innovations and 
a smaller area for owned innovations.  We have discussed where to locate this 
boundary in order to maximize the rate of innovation.   
                                                 
15 Scholars disagree about the best legal arrangements under which Google should be 
allowed to proceed. See Pam Samuelson,… 
16 Curve B is a concave function with a unique maximum.  Another possibility is a 
convex function with two local maxima, one for weak intellectual property rights and one 
for strong intellectual property rights.  Another possibility is multiple equilibria. For 
analyzing many activities, economists assume a concave function with a unique 
maximum.      18 
Here is a different question:  “For owned innovations, how broad should 
each patent be?”  Holding constant the scope of owned innovations, the patent 
authorities can award few patents with broad scope or many patents with narrow 
scope.  Similarly, a government planner can divide undeveloped land into many 
small lots or a few large lots.
17  The breadth of patents resembles the size of lots 
in a new development.  Thus assume that firm A invents innovation a in Figure 
2.4, and firm B subsequently invents innovation b.   The patent office could 
decide that the two innovations are really just one innovation and award a patent 
to A that encompasses a and b.  Alternatively, the patent office could decide that 
the two innovations are different and award two patents, a patent for a to A and a 
patent for b to B.  
Instead of waiting for the state to broaden patents, private firms can 
consolidate them.
18  Each member of a patent pool agrees in advance to cross-
license its patents for a given technology to everyone else.  Pooling patents thus 
eliminates market transactions among members who use innovations in the pool.  
When market transactions disappear, the deadweight loss of monopoly and the 
negotiating costs of licensing also disappear.  Thus assume that firm A plans to 
develop innovation a in Figure 2.4, and firm B plans to develop innovation b, and 
the innovations are interdependent.  A and B agree in advance to share 
information and patents.  Thus A acquires the contractual right to use b, and B 
acquires the contractual right to use a, without further negotiations or fees.   
                                                 
17 Once lots are surveyed in a new town, owners can buy and sell them, but they cannot buy or 
sell a fraction of a lot.  Much the same is true for selling a fraction of a patent. Leasing a fraction 
of a lot or patent is another matter.  The owner who cannot sell a fraction of a lot can contract to 
allow someone to use it.  Some theorists think that this fact demarcates the essential difference 
between property law and contract law.  See Merrill and Smith…Similarly, the owner of a patent 
can contract to allow others to use it, but the owner cannot sell half of a patent to one person and 
half of it to another. 
18 According to the Coase Theorem, private contracts will correct inefficiencies in default 
legal rules so long as transaction costs are zero.  See Ronald Coase, “The Problem of 
Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics 3 (1960): 1-44.  Also see Robert Cooter and 
Tom Ulen, Law and Economics, 6th ed., Law and Economics (New York: Addison 
Wesley, 2011), Chapter 4.    19 
The “patent pool” in this example involves two innovations and two firms, 
whereas some modern patent pools involve many firms and patents.   Why don’t 
patent pools expand until they form the Universal Patent Pool?  It would replace 
individual ownership with common ownership of patents through cross licensing.  
Although some patent pools are large, they contain a relatively small proportion 
of patents and they pose no threat of abolishing private ownership of inventions.  
Asymmetrical information explains why.  Inventors of exceptionally valuable 
innovations usually know their worth better than outsiders.  These inventors do 
not want to trade their inventions for access to the inventions of others.  Each 
inventor has an incentive to withhold its most promising innovations from a pool 
and to supply its least promising innovations to the pool.   Asymmetrical 
information about innovations causes distrust, which precludes anything like the 
Universal Patent Pool.  
Instead of pooling patents, private firms can consolidate them by merging.  
Thus firm A that owns patent a can merge with firm B that owns patent b, thus 
forming the firm A+B that owns patents a+b.  Like pools, mergers eliminate 
bilateral licensing of innovations and its associated costs – deadweight loss and 
negotiating costs of licensing.  Why don’t technology firms merge into one 
gigantic firm, thus forming the Universal Innovator Incorporated?   
Asymmetrical information inhibits forming the Universal Innovator 
Incorporated, like it inhibits forming the Universal Patent Pool. To develop an 
innovative idea in a large firm, the innovator must negotiate with a financial 
officer for funds.  The financial officer will demand to know the details about the 
innovation and claim ownership of it for the firm.  Alternatively, the innovator can 
quit the large firm, form a startup, and negotiate with outside investors for 
development funds.  (Elsewhere I have discussed how to overcome the “double 
trust dilemma” that separates new ideas and capital.
19) 
                                                 
19 See Robert Cooter and Hans-Bernd Schaefer, Solomon’s Knot: How Law Can End the 
Poverty of Nations (Princeton University Press, 2011).    20 
A creative person with new ideas often prefers to negotiate as an equal 
with outside investors, rather than to negotiate as an employee with the firm’s 
financial officer.  This is especially true when the creator believes that he has an 
exceptionally valuable idea for an innovation.  No one should be surprised that 
innovators using their own ideas and borrowed capital act differently from 
employees who give their ideas to the firm in exchange for its capital.  Compared 
to large firms, startups are riskier and more profitable for innovators.  Innovators 
especially prefer more risk and higher expected profits when they believe that 
their innovation is more valuable than others appreciate.  Forms of creativity with 
asymmetrical information and especially high profit expectations – the 
innovations that often transform industries -- tend to wilt in large firms and sprout 
in small firms. 
When innovative firms fail to combine their patents by merging or pooling, 
as they often do, patent authorities can do it for them by broadening patents.
20  
Thus if firm A invents innovation a in Figure 2.4, and firm B subsequently invents 
innovation b, the patent office can decide that the two innovations are really just 
one innovation and award a patent to A that encompasses a and b.  The result is 
much the same as if A bought B on extremely favorable terms. If A and B foresee 
these facts before the invention of b, then inventive effort will probably shift from 
B to A.  Either A will try to invent b and B will not try, or else A will contract with B 
to develop b.  Patent authorities should not broaden patents too far for the same 
reason that the state should not force innovative firms to merge or pool.  Very 
broad patents inhibit creativity much like very large firms and very large patent 
pools 
 
                                                 
20 This corresponds to the prescription in the economic analysis of law that default rules 
should minimize transactions.  See Robert Cooter and Tom Ulen, Law and Economics, 
6th ed., Law and Economics (6
th edition, New York: Addison Wesley, 2011), Chapter 9.   21 
III. Conclusion 
 
Which ownership rules maximize the pace of economic innovation?  
Answering the normative question of growth economics requires comparing two 
opposite effects of stronger intellectual property rights.  The first effect is a 
transfer from static activities (consumption and production) to dynamic activities 
(innovation), which increases the profitability and pace of innovation.  According 
to the overtaking theorem mentioned in the introduction, transfers from static 
activities to dynamic activities increase welfare.  So the first effect favors strong 
intellectual property and more private ownership of innovations.  The second 
effect is the dead-weight loss and licensing costs in dynamic activities, which 
decreases the profitability and pace of innovation. So the second effect favors 
weak intellectual property rights and less private ownership of innovations. 
A metaphor represents these facts.  Think of innovations as shrubs that 
can grow in a clearing or a thicket.  An innovation that does not use other 
innovations is like a shrub growing in a clearing.  Such an innovation is 
independent from other innovations.  With independence, making an innovation 
does not require using another innovation, so stronger patents increase the 
innovators’ output prices without directly affecting innovators’ input prices.
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Alternatively, some innovations use other innovations, like a carriage uses 
wheels.   An innovation that uses other innovations resembles a shrub growing in 
a thicket.  Such an innovation is interdependent with other innovations.  With 
interdependence, making an innovation requires using another innovation, so 
strengthening patents increase the innovator’s prices for inputs and outputs.   
The general prescription is  “stronger intellectual property rights for an innovation 
in a clearing and weaker rights for innovations in a thicket.”   
This prescription exposes a basic confusion in the standard normative 
analysis of innovation.   When strong patents increase consumer prices, the pace 
                                                 
21 In the economy, almost everything affects everything else indirectly.  Thus innovation 
A and B may be separable in production – inventing either of them does not use the other 
as an input – but they may be substitutes or complements in consumption, so the price of 
one affects how much people will pay for the other.     22 
of innovation quickens.  According to the standard analysis of monopoly, 
intellectual property should balance the costs of higher consumer prices and the 
benefits of growth.  The standard analysis frames the problem wrongly.  By 
relying on the standard analysis, law and policy for intellectual property have built 
on the wrong foundation.  Growth quickly overtakes the welfare effects of other 
objectives, including temporary losses to consumers from higher prices.  If higher 
prices to consumers cause faster growth, consumers will lose less than they 
soon will gain more from better goods and more wealth.  For intellectual property, 
officials should worry little about static losses and much about incentives for 
foundational and follow-on innovations. Law and policy for intellectual property 
should maximize the rate of sustained growth, not balance growth against other 
values.  Patents and copyright should have the strength that maximizes the rate 
of innovation.  This is the correct measure of whether patents are too strong or 
too weak.  
 